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2045 
USING A HYBRID SECURITIES TEST TO TACKLE 
THE PROBLEM OF PYRAMID FRAUD 
Corey Matthews* 
 
This Note examines federal securities law as a tool to deter and regulate 
illegal pyramid schemes.  Pyramid schemes are among the most prevalent 
forms of consumer fraud in the United States and they victimize thousands of 
individuals every year.  The rise of the internet and social media has made it 
even easier for pyramid promoters to target potential recruits, often those 
who are already particularly vulnerable to consumer fraud.  The federal 
securities laws have proven to be robust regulatory tools against pyramid 
schemes.  However, the test used by federal courts to determine whether a 
scheme meets the definition of a security has produced uncertainty and 
inconsistency in the law.  This Note proposes that when pyramid schemes are 
alleged, federal courts should apply a hybrid securities test that incorporates 
aspects of risk capital analysis.  In so doing, courts will be better equipped 
to focus on the economic reality of pyramid schemes and to draw a more 
principled line between illegal pyramid fraud and legitimate enterprises. 
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In April 1987, the New York Times published an article warning readers 
about the rising popularity of illegal “airplane” games cropping up in 
communities across the United States.1  Participants in the game paid an 
entrance fee, usually $1500, which entitled them to “passenger” status on the 
metaphorical “airplane.”2  A full airplane typically consisted of a pilot or 
captain, two copilots, four flight attendants, and eight passengers.3  Once the 
“airplane” was assembled, the pilot received the $12,000 collected from the 
passengers’ entrance fees and rotated out.4 
Subsequently, the two copilots became pilots of their own “airplanes,” 
taking half of the passengers with them as flight attendants.5  The flight 
attendants from the original flight became copilots, two on each new flight, 
and the game continued.6  As a player moved up the ranks, he or she was 
 
 1. Elizabeth Neuffer, ‘Airplane’:  High-Stakes Chain Letter, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/07/nyregion/airplane-high-stakes-chain-letter.html 
[https://perma.cc/XTW6-6HG2]; see also Lawrence Kilman, Newest Illegal Pyramid Scheme 
Going Up and Up, but Not Away, AP NEWS (Mar. 23, 1987), 
https://apnews.com/7894d03521da555b7ea45e6f78323fbb [https://perma.cc/73PM-4WA2]. 
 2. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Bowden, 572 So. 2d 1211, 1211–12 (Ala. 1990); State v. 
DeLuzio, 643 A.2d 535, 536–37 (N.J. 1994) (Ohern, J., dissenting); People v. Riccelli, 540 
N.Y.S.2d 74, 74 (App. Div. 1989). 
 3. See Kilman, supra note 1; Neuffer, supra note 1. 
 4. Neuffer, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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responsible for recruiting at least one passenger behind them.7  After several 
rounds, a passenger would eventually earn the pilot’s seat—a return of 
$12,000 on the $1500 initial payment—often in a matter of days.8  The only 
problem?  The game was a classic pyramid scheme:  “airplanes” needed a 
constant influx of new passengers in order to generate returns.9  This demand 
became harder to fill as ever-increasing “airplanes” branched off to form new 
ones.10  To illustrate:  for one pilot to receive a return on his investment, 
participants needed to recruit eight passengers.11  For those eight passengers 
to earn pilot status and receive a return, the crew would need sixty-four new 
passengers.12  For those sixty-four passengers to generate a profit, they 
collectively needed to bring in 512 additional players.13  Despite these odds, 
for many people, the “airplane” game represented quick and easy money; a 
victimless crime so long as recruitment was sustained.14 
Such “get rich quick” schemes have a seductive allure:  small investments, 
modest effort, and astronomical rates of return.15  But while many get rich 
quick models are easily detected and quickly fade from popularity, others 
have proved enduring and obstinate.  Illegal pyramid schemes are one such 
fraud.16  An illegal pyramid scheme rewards participants primarily for 
recruiting new individuals to join.17  However, unlike the “airplane” game, 
most schemes incorporate the sale of a sham product to disguise the true 
nature of the fraud.18  Despite widespread public awareness and concerted 
governmental efforts, illegal pyramid schemes continue to regularly enter the 
marketplace.19 
Pyramids have proliferated in the digital age, thanks in great part to the 
internet and the ubiquity of social networking.20  It is easier now, more than 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Kilman, supra note 1; Neuffer, supra note 1. 
 9. See David Enscoe, Pyramid Scheme Takes Off, Thousands Invest in “Plane Game,” 
SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 26, 1987), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1987-03-26-
8701190859-story.html [https://perma.cc/N4V4-RYH9]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id.; Neuffer, supra note 1. 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at UIC-
SEC Joint Symposium to Raise Public Awareness:  Combating Pyramid Schemes and Affinity 
Frauds Opening Remarks (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-
remarks-joint-symposium-raise-public-awareness-03022016.html [https://perma.cc/VU6Q-
3H6Y]. 
 17. See United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 18. See Jeffrey A. Babener, Network Marketing and the Law, OR. ST. B. BULL., May 1997, 
at 23, 24. 
 19. See Ceresney, supra note 16. 
 20. See James Walsh, Note, “Tis the Time’s Plague When Madmen Lead the Blind”:  How 
the IRS Can Prevent Pyramid-Scheme Formation (and Why It Should), 67 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 577, 585 (2016); Debra A. Valentine, Former Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Address at the International Monetary Funds Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting 
Central Banks (May 13, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-
schemes [https://perma.cc/53DK-34VQ]) (opining that the growth of internet marketing has 
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ever, for companies to enlist distributors to sell products like vitamins, beauty 
supplies, and home goods through their personal networks.21 
Unfortunately, all illegal pyramids are structurally doomed to fail.22  
Pyramid schemes fundamentally rely upon the continuous recruitment of 
new distributors.23  The enterprises generate revenue not from the sale of 
goods to end users but from new distributors’ entrance fees and inventory 
purchases.24  Those distributors are then rewarded with either a bonus or 
commission on the purchases made by those they have recruited.25  All such 
schemes, however, inevitably collapse once a given market for new 
distributors becomes saturated.26 
Two federal agencies shoulder the main responsibility for regulation and 
enforcement in this area:  the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).27  The FTC typically brings 
complaints against pyramids for engaging in unfair and deceptive practices,28 
a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).29  The 
FTC has had some success in shutting down illegal pyramids with this 
approach.30 
Under the SEC’s ambit, when courts find that pyramid schemes constitute 
securities offerings, various other tools are available to federal regulators and 
private litigants.31  The SEC may pursue pyramids for offering unregistered 
 
been the most significant contributor to pyramid scheme growth in the United States because 
electronic commerce allows fraudsters to target victims quickly and cost-effectively). 
 21. See Walsh, supra note 20, at 585. 
 22. See Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1996); Ziven Scott 
Birdwell, The Key Elements for Developing a Securities Market to Drive Economic Growth:  
A Roadmap for Emerging Markets, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 561 (2011); Adam 
Epstein, Multi-level Marketing and Its Brethren:  The Legal and Regulatory Environment in 
the Down Economy, 12 ATLANTIC L.J. 91, 104 (2010); Investor Protection Guide:  Pyramid 
Scheme, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/investor_protection_guide_pyramid_scheme 
[https://perma.cc/A4DX-7EXU] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 23. Clinton D. Howie, Is It a Pyramid Scheme?:  Multilevel Marketing and Louisiana’s 
“New” Anti-pyramid Statute, 49 LA. B.J. 288, 289 (2002); see also Rhonda Bundy, Note, 
Federal Securities Regulations:  Do They Adequately Serve Their Prescribed Purpose of 
Protecting Investors from Pyramid Schemes?, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 125 (1990). 
 24. Howie, supra note 23, at 289. 
 25. Id.; Bundy, supra note 23, at 127. 
 26. See SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc. (Loan Network II), 968 F.2d 1304, 1308–09 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992); Sergio Pareja, Sales Gone Wild:  Will the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule Put 
an End to Pyramid Marketing Schemes?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 83, 85–87 (2008); see also 
Bundy, supra note 23, at 128 (noting that market saturation frustrates the ability of late-
entering participants to recoup investments). 
 27. See Note, Pyramid Schemes:  Dare to Be Regulated, 61 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1257 (1973). 
 28. See Heidi Liu, The Behavioral Economics of Multilevel Marketing, 14 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 109, 117–18 (2018); see also Epstein, supra note 22, at 101–02. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). 
 30. Walsh, supra note 20, at 587–88. 
 31. See, e.g., Birdwell, supra note 22, at 562–63 (discussing the SEC’s role in shutting 
down pyramid schemes); Bundy, supra note 23, at 124 (noting that of the available avenues 
of redress for victims of pyramid fraud, securities law seems to be the most viable solution for 
curtailing the problem of high-pressure, fraudulent investment schemes). 
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securities, a violation of the Securities Act of 1933,32 or for violating section 
10(b)33 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-534, which 
prohibit individuals from making materially false or misleading statements 
in connection with the sale or purchase of a security.35  Further, violators who 
run afoul of the federal securities laws can also face criminal liability under 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes.36  Additionally, private litigants may 
bring suit under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA).37  Moreover, state-specific securities laws may apply to illegal 
pyramids.38  Both SEC and state security enforcement, however, are 
necessarily contingent upon the classification of a pyramid scheme as a 
security.39  Finally, state antipyramid or chain distribution statutes may 
prevent and prohibit pyramid schemes.40 
In Part I, this Note explores the various federal and state regulatory and 
enforcement regimes targeting pyramid schemes.  This Part also considers 
the benefits and obstacles of those regulatory approaches.  In Part II, this 
Note suggests that the federal securities law are viable and useful tools for 
shutting down and deterring formation of pyramids schemes.  Part II 
thereafter analyzes two different tests used to determine whether an illegal 
pyramid scheme involves the sale of a security.  In Part III, this Note argues 
that the final prong of the risk capital test used by some state courts more 
accurately captures the economic realities of a pyramid scheme.  Further, Part 
III argues that in the context of pyramid schemes, incorporating this last 
prong of the risk capital test into the current federal test for investment 
contracts will better serve the purposes of the federal securities law and 
provide stronger tools to protect against pyramid-based fraud. 
I.  CLASSIFICATION AND REGULATION OF PYRAMID SCHEMES 
Part I explains what a pyramid scheme is and how various governmental 
actors approach regulation, enforcement, and prevention of illegal pyramid 
fraud.  Part I.A provides an overview of the broad distribution model known 
as multilevel marketing (MLM) and distinguishes between legitimate MLM 
programs and illegal pyramids.  Part I.A further explores why illegal 
pyramids are doomed to fail, and Part I.B gives an overview of the harmful 
effects of pyramid fraud in the United States.  Part I.C describes federal- and 
state-level governmental regulation of pyramid schemes, while analyzing the 
costs and benefits of the various regulatory approaches. 
 
 32. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
 33. Id. § 78j. 
 34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78b. 
 36. See generally id. §§ 77a–77aa. 
 37. See id. § 78u-4. 
 38. See Liu, supra note 28, at 116. 
 39. See Bundy, supra note 23, at 124. 
 40. Epstein, supra note 22, at 118–19. 
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A.  Separating Fraud from Fair Play 
Legal MLM companies and illegal pyramid schemes both use a similarly 
tiered organizational structure.41  The following section describes the general 
characteristics of MLM selling that may be present in both legal enterprises 
and illegal pyramids.  MLM selling is a subset of a larger universe of “direct 
sales” models.42  Direct sales companies sell products or services directly to 
the end user, typically through independent distributors,43 without using a 
retailer.44  MLM companies, in particular, tend to incentivize distributors to 
recruit new participants by offering recruitment bonuses or commissions.45 
MLM companies almost invariably use an upline/downline structure.46  
Every member has a distributor above them and at least one below that they 
have recruited into the plan.47  The “upline” members earn both direct income 
based on their own sales of goods or services and residual income from their 
“downline” participants’ sales.48  Thus, as a distributor’s downline grows, 
with each downline participant recruiting his or her own downline members, 
the upline receives commission from a greater number of sellers.49  
Accordingly, the company takes on a pyramid organizational shape through 
geometric progression as more members are needed below to support the 
income of members above.50  Nonetheless, as discussed more thoroughly 
below, not all MLM programs are illegal pyramid schemes.51 
 
 41. Id. at 92. 
 42. Liu, supra note 28, at 111. 
 43. Participants in MLM companies may go by several different titles, including 
consultants, owners, contractors, and distributors, despite performing substantially similar 
functions. See Wesley K. Dagestaad, Note, Day’s Pyramid Ignores Sturdy Severability 
Foundation, Builds off Granite Rock, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 349 n.2.  Therefore, this Note 
uses such terms interchangeably.  Independent distributors differ from traditional retailers in 
that distributors work for themselves and usually “set their own hours, create their own 
marketing plans, determine whether to build a sales team and how to mentor those within it 
and serve their customers.” What Is Direct Selling?, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, 
https://dsa.org/about/direct-selling [https://perma.cc/M7MG-5RL6] (last visited Mar. 17, 
2020). 
 44. See Peter J. Vander Nat & William W. Keep, Marketing Fraud:  An Approach for 
Differentiating Multilevel Marketing from Pyramid Schemes, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 
139, 140 (2002). 
 45. Liu, supra note 28, at 111. 
 46. See Epstein, supra note 22, at 102–04. 
 47. Id. at 102. 
 48. Id. at 102–03. 
 49. Id. at 103.  For a detailed description of a typical MLM reward system, see William 
W. Keep & Peter J. Vander Nat, Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in the United 
States:  An Historical Analysis, 6 J. HIST. RES. MARKETING 188, 195 (2014). 
 50. For a diagram illustrating geometric progression in a sales-recruitment context, see 
Vincent G. Ella, Comment, Multi-level or Pyramid Sales Systems:  Fraud or Free Enterprise, 
18 S.D. L. REV. 358, 361 n.8 (1973). 
 51. Liu, supra note 28, at 115. 
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1.  Fair Play:  Legal MLM Selling and Its Advantages 
Legal MLM companies are commonly confused with, or categorized as, 
illegal pyramid schemes because of organizational similarities.52  Further, 
there is no clear dividing line in the law that separates legitimate MLM 
programs from illegal pyramid schemes.53  Currently, there is no federal 
statutory definition of an illegal pyramid scheme and the courts have been 
inconsistent in how they distinguish pyramid schemes from MLM 
companies, which exacerbates confusion.54  Nonetheless, there are several 
hallmarks of legitimate MLM businesses that set them apart from illegal 
schemes. 
The first, and arguably most important, hallmark is that legitimate MLM 
companies focus primarily on real sales of marketable55 products to real 
consumers outside of the plan.56  The FTC has broken this principle down 
into four guideposts:  (1) sales must be to real customers; (2) sales must be 
profitable and verifiable; (3) program targets or thresholds should not be 
satisfied by product purchases alone; and (4) compensation must be based on 
genuine retail sales.57  Second, legitimate MLM companies tend to accurately 
represent the potential income or profits that their distributors can expect and 
the degree of time or effort required to achieve success in the plans.58  
Further, legal MLM programs rarely require distributors to make minimum 
inventory purchases to participate.59  Finally, legitimate MLM programs 
typically maintain a buyback policy through which the company will 
repurchase inventory and sales kits from distributors wishing to leave the 
program.60 
Legitimate MLM selling has benefits as a business model.  For instance, 
direct selling through multilevel channels has low fixed costs, particularly 
 
 52. See United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 53. See Walsh, supra note 20, at 583. 
 54. Compare SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters. (Glenn Turner II), 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 
1973) (taking into account the mathematical probability of market saturation in finding the 
scheme fraudulent), with Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the 
mathematical impossibility that continuous recruitment could be sustained, yet declining to 
conclude that the challenged scheme was deceptive). 
 55. Marketable products are those with competitive pricing and genuine demand in the 
marketplace. Babener, supra note 18, at 24.  Illegal pyramids masquerading as legitimate 
MLM companies may sometimes claim substantial revenue from product sales, yet charge far 
above reasonable retail value for such products. See, e.g., FTC v. BurnLounge, Inc., 753 F.3d 
878, 883 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 56. See Ceresney, supra note 16. 
 57. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Remarks of FTC 
Chairwoman Ramirez:  DSA Business & Policy Conference 5–6 (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/993473/ramirez_-
_dsa_speech_10-25-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/U752-AQNT]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Babener, supra note 18, at 24.  But see Whole Living, Inc. v. Tolman, 344 F. Supp. 
2d 739, 742 (D. Utah 2004) (finding an MLM company to be legitimate and legal despite the 
absence of a buyback policy because its products were perishable and because the program’s 
structure did not incentivize large purchases of inventory unrelated to demand for product). 
2052 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
when compared to the price of operating traditional retail outlets.61  Further, 
in an MLM program, the existing sales force is responsible for training and 
recruiting new participants.62  The MLM model also emphasizes 
entrepreneurship by encouraging social relationships between customers and 
distributors, rewarding personal selling through commission, and offering 
participants the independence and autonomy to build their own businesses 
and “downline.”63  Successful direct selling can be difficult because it 
requires strong personal sales skills and a substantial investment of time and 
social capital.64  However, it does offer participants an opportunity to earn 
supplemental income and, in rare cases, more substantial profit.65 
2.  Fraud:  Illegal Pyramid Schemes 
In contrast to MLM companies, pyramid schemes are inherently 
fraudulent.66  The term “pyramid scheme” has both a broad and specific 
meaning.67  Broadly, a pyramid scheme is a kind of money-transfer 
arrangement that relies on perpetual recruitment.68  Each participant pays a 
fee to enter the program and, in turn, receives the right to earn a portion of 
the fees paid by those recruited below them.69  However, “[a]s recruitment 
continues, the number of people at or near the base of the recruitment 
structure grows very rapidly, often at an exponential rate for as long as a 
successful recruitment pattern is maintained.”70  Accordingly, those at the 
bottom struggle to recruit enough new members to recoup their investment.71  
Only the very few at the top earn a profit because the base necessarily 
represents the vast majority of participants.72 
 
 61. Vander Nat & Keep, supra note 44, at 140. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  Legitimate MLM distributors do earn a commission on sales of products by those 
whom they have recruited or sponsored.  However, such a structure does not, on its own, 
render the program an illegal pyramid scheme. See Whole Living, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 745–46. 
 64. See Vander Nat & Keep, supra note 44, at 140–41. 
 65. See Ramirez, supra note 57, at 2–3. 
 66. Birdwell, supra note 22, at 561. 
 67. Keep & Vander Nat, supra note 49, at 196. 
 68. Id. The terms “pyramid scheme” and “Ponzi scheme” are often grouped together or 
used interchangeably. See, e.g., Orlick v. Kozyack (In re Fin. Federated Title & Tr., Inc.), 309 
F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2002).  However, they are related, yet distinct concepts. See 
Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 132 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008).  Pyramid schemes funnel money to 
participants by rewarding them for recruiting others, while Ponzi schemes pay initial investors 
directly with money contributed by later investors. United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 
F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 69. See Keep & Vander Nat, supra note 49, at 196–97. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. at 197; see also Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1106, 1132–33, 1181 (1975) 
(observing that an illegal pyramid scheme is really just an elaborate chain letter device in 
which most individuals who hope to regain their initial payment are bound to be disappointed); 
J. L. Gastwirth & P. K. Bhattacharya, Two Probability Models of Pyramid or Chain Letter 
Schemes Demonstrating That Their Promotional Claims Are Unreliable, 32 OPERATIONS RES. 
527, 530 (1984) (reporting the statistical probabilities of expected returns for pyramid scheme 
participants based on time of entry into the program). 
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The specific definition of “pyramid scheme” is an organization that masks 
a perpetual recruitment chain with the sale of a product or service through a 
traditional MLM model.73  However, in an MLM-based pyramid scheme, 
while products are bought and sold by participants, compensation is still 
derived chiefly from recruitment rather than market-based retail activity.74 
There are several consistent attributes of MLM-based pyramid schemes.  
For instance, such schemes typically use a system of graduated product 
prices.75  In this system, each distributor purchases products at a lower price 
than what he charges the public and what he charges if he sells to participants 
below him in the distribution chain.76 
For example, a distributor at the lowest participant level, Distributor A, 
may be entitled to purchase product from the parent company, for sale to the 
public, at a 40 percent discount on the retail sales price.77  However, 
Distributor B, having achieved membership in the tier directly above 
Distributor A, may be able to purchase product at a 55 percent discount.78  
Distributor B, further, has rights to sell both to the public and to Distributor 
A.  Distributor B, therefore, earns up to a 15 percent override on A’s sales 
and may offer her customers a lower price for the product yet enjoy the same 
profit margins as Distributor A.79 
As such, if both Distributors A and B operate in the same geographic or 
social market, Distributor A is at a significant competitive disadvantage 
because he must pay more for inventory.  Accordingly, Distributor A has a 
strong incentive to move up in the chain.  If Distributor A rises in the 
program, he will earn a larger wholesale discount along with the right to 
recruit and sell to participants below him.80  In such a system, therefore, 
moving up in the scheme is the easiest and most effective way for Distributor 
A to earn income.81 
These graduated price arrangements typically lead to another common 
practice of MLM-based pyramid schemes known as inventory loading.82  In 
many illegal pyramids, participants may advance in the program solely by 
 
 73. Stacie Bosley & Maggie Knorr, Pyramids, Ponzis and Fraud Prevention:  Lessons 
from a Case Study, 25 J. FIN. CRIME 81, 82 (2018); Keep & Vander Nat, supra note 49, at 
196–97. 
 74. Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 82; see also Koscot Interplanetary, 86 F.T.C. at 
1181 (noting that the presence of “recruitment with rewards unrelated to product sales” is the 
sine qua non of a pyramid scheme). 
 75. See Note, supra note 27, at 1258–59. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Ella, supra note 50, at 362. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 362–63. 
 82. See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-level Marketing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/business-guidance-concerning-multi-
level-marketing [https://perma.cc/U9VD-CUUU] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); see, e.g., 
Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 782–83 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing the scheme 
participant’s testimony that distributors would purchase excessive quantities of product that 
were entirely unrelated to actual market demand). 
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meeting a threshold for minimum wholesale product purchases.83  Distributor 
A, for instance, may move up to the same tier as Distributor B by purchasing 
a large quantity of inventory in bulk.84  Importantly, in illegal schemes, there 
is no requirement that Distributor A later prove that he has resold any product 
to customers outside the program.85  Rather, so long as Distributor A recruits 
someone below him, Distributor C, then Distributor A has a built-in market 
to offload the inventory to lower-level distributors at a profit.86 
Thus, the system encourages internal sales through continuous recruitment 
and de-emphasizes sales to retail consumers outside of the plan.87  As such, 
MLM-based illegal pyramids use products predominantly to conceal the 
fraud, and such products are frequently not competitive in a real-world 
marketplace.88  Rather, existing participants are compensated by money 
coming in from new recruits and those below them in an endless-chain 
fashion.89 
Expectedly, MLM-based pyramids must rely on the continuous enlistment 
of new participants.90  As such, the payment of bonuses upon successful 
recruitment of a new member is another hallmark of such schemes.91  These 
payments are not based on the recruited distributors’ actual sales.92  Instead, 
they represent a predetermined percentage of the fee a new distributor must 
pay or the cost of products they must purchase to enter the program.93 
 
 83. See Ella, supra note 50, at 362. 
 84. See Babener, supra note 18, at 24–25. 
 85. See Omnitrition, 79 F.3d at 782 (describing rewards that are not tied to product sales 
to end users because they are earned “based on the suggested retail price of the amount ordered 
from Omnitrition, rather than based on actual sales to consumers”). 
 86. See id. (observing that lucrative rewards for recruitment induce participants to focus 
on that part of the business, “making it unlikely that meaningful opportunities for retail sales 
will occur” (citing Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1106, 1132–33, 1181 (1975))).  This 
is one of the reasons why the FTC focuses so heavily on determining whether products are 
sold principally to consumers outside of the program. Ramirez, supra note 57, at 5–10. 
 87. See Ramirez, supra note 57, at 6 (“When a product is tied to a business opportunity, 
experience teaches that the people buying it may well be motivated by reasons other than 
actual product demand.”). 
 88. See Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 95, 148–49 (1974) (noting that the presence of some 
retail sales does not impact the fundamentally unlawful character of pyramid schemes); see 
also supra note 55 and accompanying text.  A related problem arises when new distributors 
are recruited so rapidly that supply outpaces demand to such a degree that most distributors 
have virtually no chance of retailing products. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelly v. Koscot 
Interplanetary, Inc., 195 N.W.2d 43, 52–53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that for all plan 
participants in Michigan to realize the promoters’ stated income projections, the company as 
a whole would have needed to sell $300,000,000 worth of its cosmetics in that state in a year; 
this figure was $20,000,000 more than the estimated total market demand for such goods in 
the state). 
 89. Fast Answers:  Pyramid Schemes, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 9, 2013), 
https://sec.gov/fast-answers/answerspyramidhtm.html [https://perma.cc/7V72-CDH2]. 
 90. Babener, supra note 18, at 24. 
 91. Id.; Walsh, supra note 20, at 582 (observing that the most significant common 
characteristic of all illegal pyramid schemes is payments in exchange for the right to recruit 
others into the scheme). 
 92. See Keep & Vander Nat, supra note 49, at 198. 
 93. See id. at 196–97. 
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B.  Pyramid Fraud and the Harm to Consumers 
As Part I.A demonstrated, the fundamental flaw in any pyramid scheme is 
the inescapable reality that only a finite number of investors can ever recoup 
their initial investments.94  Pyramids are deliberately designed to grow 
exponentially and rapidly.95  When the schemes inevitably grow too large, it 
becomes impossible to recruit enough new members to pay back existing 
ones.96  As a result, the large majority of participants lose money simply 
because they enter the scheme after it has already become unsustainable.97 
Because pyramids require continuous recruitment, they employ 
misrepresentations and unrealistic promises of success or potential 
earnings.98  First, the schemes intentionally use convoluted reward structures 
and sale plans to mask the fraudulent nature of the program.99  Second, 
pyramid schemes frequently look very similar to legitimate MLM plans, 
making it even more difficult for the average distributor to distinguish fraud 
from fair play.100 
Third, pyramid schemes historically capitalize on potential participants’ 
lack of financial knowledge or expertise.101  Scheme promoters often target 
populations that are most susceptible to deceptive promises and those who 
lack the necessary financial experience or expertise to identify the flaws in 
the program.102  For instance, communities or social networks with high 
levels of underemployment and unemployment are particularly susceptible 
to pyramid fraud victimization.103  There is also a documented correlation 
 
 94. Gastwirth & Bhattacharya, supra note 72, at 528; Joseph P. Whitford, Note, Pyramid 
Scheme Regulation:  The Evolution of Investment Contracts as a Security Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 690, 694 (1974). 
 95. See Fast Answers:  Pyramid Schemes, supra note 89. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Note, supra note 27, at 1259 (commenting on the widespread use of high-pressure 
sales tactics, misleading presentations, and deceitful enthusiasm, which create an expectation 
of dazzling financial returns in exchange for modest effort and time). 
 99. See Vander Nat & Keep, supra note 44, at 141. 
 100. See Lauren Bell, Pyramid Dream, BALT. MAG. (June 2018), 
https://www.baltimoremagazine.com/2018/6/12/multi-level-marketing-companies-evolve-
with-21st-century [https://perma.cc/MNQ5-X2BE] (discussing the growth of the MLM 
business, the allure of MLM selling, and the difficulty participants have in identifying and 
assessing the risk that what appears to be a legitimate MLM company is in truth a pyramid 
scheme); see also Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 82 (noting the growth of more 
sophisticated pyramid offerings set within the context of purportedly legitimate MLM 
companies). 
 101. See Note, supra note 27, at 1261 (commenting that pyramid plans are aimed at the 
general public and often employ recruitment tactics designed to make it difficult for potential 
investors to come to intelligent or thoughtful decisions). 
 102. Whitford, supra note 94, at 694.  But see Stacie A. Bosley et al., Decision-Making and 
Vulnerability in a Pyramid Scheme Fraud, 80 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 1, 5 (2019) 
(reporting more recent data that may contradict the stereotype of fraud victims as older, less 
sophisticated, and uneducated). 
 103. See Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 84, 87; Stacie Bosley & Kim K. McKeage, 
Multilevel Marketing Diffusion and the Risk of Pyramid Scheme Activity:  The Case of Fortune 
Hi-tech Marketing in Montana, 34 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 84, 93 (2015) (finding that 
counties in Montana with higher unemployment and greater economic contractions were more 
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between lower levels of educational attainment and membership in pyramid 
schemes.104  The schemes also frequently appeal to those with fewer 
opportunities in the mainstream job market105 because the schemes are often 
billed as a supplementary and flexible income source that require only a small 
initial outlay of capital.106 
Fourth, because recruitment requires leveraging community ties and social 
networks, there is significant overlap between affinity fraud and pyramid 
fraud.107  Affinity fraud “refers to investment scams that prey upon members 
of identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, 
or professional groups.”108  Such schemes can be particularly harmful to 
individuals and communities because they exploit group trust, friendship, 
and commonality.109  Affinity fraud can also be especially difficult to detect 
and stop because the close relationships among groups often make victims 
reluctant to report the fraud or seek legal redress.110  This problem is 
particularly acute when scheme promoters have convinced respected group 
members or community leaders to promote the fraud and encourage others to 
join.111 
 
susceptible to recruitment efforts of a particular pyramid scheme); Ralph E. Stone & Jeffrey 
M. Steiner, The Federal Trade Commission and Pyramid Sales Schemes, 15 PAC. L.J. 879, 
892 (1983) (noting that pyramid sales schemes are more popular during periods of economic 
uncertainty). 
 104. Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 90. 
 105. See id. at 84; Kathy Peiss, “Vital Industry” and Women’s Ventures:  Conceptualizing 
Gender in Twentieth Century Business History, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 218, 235–36 (1998) 
(discussing the ways that pyramid sales have appealed to working mothers as flexible job 
opportunities). 
 106. See Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 84. 
 107. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate:  Why Affinity-Based 
Securities and Investment Fraud Constitutes a Hate Crime, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1082 
(2003); Lisa M. Fairfax, “With Friends Like These . . .”:  Toward a More Efficacious 
Response to Affinity-Based Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REV. 63, 72 (2001).  
Even where affinity groups are not involved, the importance of social networking, combined 
with the high-pressure sales and recruiting tactics typical of direct selling, may make 
distributors reluctant to leave programs even when they have incurred substantial financial 
losses. See, e.g., Amelia Tait, ‘They Have You in a Cultish Grip’:  The Women Losing 
Thousands to Online Beauty Schemes, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2019), 
https://theguardian.com/fashion/2019/jun/01/online-beauty-schemes-selling-social-media-
younique-arbonne [https://perma.cc/EV3H-P2R7]. 
 108. Affinity Fraud:  How to Avoid Investment Scams That Target Groups, SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TDR6-MEDC] (noting that affinity scams frequently involve Ponzi or 
pyramid schemes). 
 109. Investor Alert:  Affinity Fraud, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 18, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ia_affinityfraud.html 
[https://perma.cc/4JBM-HSYP]; see also David E. Austin, Comment, “In God We Trust”:  
The Cultural and Social Impact of Affinity Fraud in the African American Church, 4 U. MD. 
L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 365, 365 (2004) (observing that affinity fraud can be 
especially effective among minority groups with a documented history of oppression, such as 
the African-American community, because the trust implicit among members is often 
particularly strong when the group has experienced social marginalization). 
 110. Investor Alert:  Affinity Fraud, supra note 109. 
 111. Id. 
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Several factors complicate enforcement and prevention, making it difficult 
to gauge the precise amount of money that victims in the United States lose 
to pyramid schemes each year.112  Settlements with both the FTC and SEC 
commonly reach tens of millions of dollars.113  Additionally, the FTC’s most 
recent survey indicates that around 1.5 million people fall victim to pyramid 
scheme fraud in the United States in any given year.114  Unfortunately, of all 
monitored consumer fraud victim groups, pyramid scheme victims are the 
least likely to make formal reports to government authorities.115  This may 
be because, when compared to Ponzi schemes—in which there are usually 
fewer victims who each lose larger sums116—pyramids tend to involve a 
greater number of victims who each lose a smaller amount.117  There is also 
evidence that pyramid promoters stigmatize those who leave the program, 
announcing that participants who fail do so because of a lack of skill or 
dedication.118  Finally, researchers have identified that guilt is a strong 
deterrent to victim reporting, a phenomenon that is unique to pyramid scheme 
fraud.119  As participants feel regret and embarrassment for bringing in 
friends, family members, or colleagues, they are less likely to speak up about 
the experience.120  Because of such low reporting rates and high social 
connectivity among pyramid scheme victim groups, prevention and 
enforcement are particularly important in this area.121 
 
 112. See Keep & Vander Nat, supra note 49, at 203–05 (noting the dearth of verifiable data 
regarding MLM and pyramid sales). 
 113. See Terrell McSweeney, Congress Should Crack Down on Predatory ‘Pyramid 
Schemes,’ Not Look Away, HILL (Aug. 3, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/finance/345073-congress-should-crack-down-on-predatory-pyramid-schemes-not-look 
[https://perma.cc/WJL7-68NA] (reporting two FTC settlements with Herbalife and Fortune 
Hi-Tech Marketing totaling a combined $210 million and the $17 million lost by victims of 
the BurnLounge scheme). 
 114. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011:  THE THIRD 
FTC SURVEY 18–19 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
consumer-fraud-united-states-2011-third-ftc-survey/130419fraudsurvey_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22AR-BE3S]. 
 115. Bosley et al., supra note 102, at 1–2. 
 116. See, e.g., Scott Cohn, Want to Work at Home?:  Take a Lesson from This $3 Billion 
Pyramid Scheme, CNBC (June 22, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/21/want-
to-work-at-home-take-a-lesson-from-this-3-billion-pyramid-scam.html 
[https://perma.cc/A9JV-LTTT] (comparing the TelexFree pyramid scheme, which defrauded 
an estimated 1.8 billion victims worldwide out of $3 billion, with Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi 
scheme, which victimized several thousand people but generated $17.5 billion in losses). 
 117. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 114, at 39 (reporting that 50 percent of pyramid 
scheme victims who provided information on payments reported paying at least $200). 
 118. See Bosley et al., supra note 102, at 11. 
 119. Id. (“This last factor is unique to pyramid scheme fraud as it is the only form of fraud 
that, by definition, incentivizes person-to-person recruitment.”). 
 120. See Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 83. 
 121. See Bosley et al., supra note 102, at 2. 
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C.  The Landscape of Existing Laws and Regulations 
Hundreds of thousands of Americans participate in MLM-based direct 
sales every year.122  While many work within legitimate MLM companies, a 
great number of people unknowingly sign up for illegal pyramids.123  The 
overwhelming majority of these people lose money in the process.124  Both 
state and federal agencies have worked hard to educate the public on how to 
spot and avoid fraudulent schemes.125  However, it is difficult for the public 
to identify fraudulent programs effectively when government actors 
themselves have trouble separating the legitimate from the illegal.126  As a 
result, government intervention has focused more on detection of, and 
enforcement against, illegal pyramids.127 
However, one of the reasons pyramid schemes are so difficult to detect and 
stamp out is that they exist in a legal gray area.128  On the federal level, MLM 
programs—both the legitimate enterprises and MLM-based pyramids—fall 
outside the FTC’s definition of a franchise.129  Accordingly franchise 
regulations and disclosure requirements do not apply to pyramids.130  
Moreover, as discussed more thoroughly below,131 FTC enforcement actions 
charging unfair and deceptive practices have thus far not proved especially 
effective at deterring pyramid scheme formation.132  Further, with the 
exception of the Ninth Circuit,133 the federal courts have been unwilling to 
 
 122. See Direct Selling in the United States:  2018 Industry Overview, DIRECT SELLING 
ASS’N 1, https://www.dsa.org/docs/default-source/action-alerts/2018industryoverview-
06032019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEC7-Q7QW] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 123. Pareja, supra note 26, at 84–85. 
 124. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 114, at 13 (reporting that often 90 percent or more 
of participants in pyramid schemes do not recoup their initial investment). 
 125. See, e.g., Business Guidance Concerning Multi-level Marketing, supra note 82; Dana 
Nessel, Consumer Alert:  Multi-level Marketing or Illegal Pyramid Scheme?, MICH. ATT’Y 
GEN., https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534, 7-164-177337_20942-208400--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/PZ34-BFDX] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 126. See Walsh, supra note 20, at 583 (noting that courts, legislators, and enforcement 
agencies have all struggled to adequately define the term “pyramid scheme”). 
 127. See Note, supra note 27, at 1266, 1274. 
 128. See Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 81 (explaining that pyramid schemes operate 
in a complicated practical and legal environment); Walsh, supra note 20, at 583. 
 129. See Business Opportunity Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,816 (Dec. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 437) (noting that because of the minimum investment and inventory exemptions 
to the franchise rule, pyramid schemes are not covered); W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE 
AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.11 (2019) (noting that sales distributorships differ 
from franchises in that (1) distributors do not pay franchise fees for the right to resell a product 
or use the trademark of a supplier; (2) the supplier in a distributorship will rarely provide a 
marketing system or plan; and (3) the distributor has no rights to the supplier’s trademark). 
 130. See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-level Marketing, supra note 82, ¶ 10. 
 131. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 132. See Pareja, supra note 26, at 94–97 (noting the difficulty in gathering evidence of 
unfair or deceptive acts and reporting that, between January 1997 and December 2005, 
consumers submitted 17,858 complaints regarding pyramid schemes but the FTC only brought 
twenty cases against such schemes under the FTCA between 1990 and 2008). 
 133. See Glenn Turner II, 474 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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hold that pyramid schemes are per se securities.134  Moreover, state-level 
regulation has been problematic for two reasons.  First, predatory pyramid 
schemes are able to move easily across state lines to avoid disclosure 
requirements or limit liability in future enforcement actions.135  Second, for 
legal MLM companies, inconsistent state laws and regulatory regimes 
complicate risk assessment, and this unpredictability may discourage the 
growth of legitimate businesses.136 
1.  The States 
Though there is no federal antipyramid scheme statute, many states have 
passed laws targeting pyramid schemes and other kinds of chain promotion 
or distribution plans.137  Typically, state statutes either target pyramids 
specifically or handle them within broader statutes prohibiting deceptive 
trade practices.138  These laws vary greatly, as do the individual state 
definitions of the term “pyramid scheme.”139  However, many states do at 
least prohibit the sale of business opportunities140 unless the seller provides 
the prospective participant with a presale disclosure document that has been 
filed with the relevant state agency.141  Nonetheless, twenty-one states have 
antipyramid scheme laws that define pyramid fraud and distinguish the 
practices of such schemes from those of legitimate businesses.142  
 
 134. See, e.g., Davis v. AVCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984); Ranieri v. 
AdvoCare Int’l, L.P., 336 F. Supp. 3d 701, 713–14 (N.D. Tex. 2018); Kerrigan v. ViSalus, 
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 580, 598–99 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 135. Note, supra note 27, at 1265. 
 136. See id. at 1257, 1265–66. 
 137. Epstein, supra note 22, at 118–19.  For decades, commentators have called on 
Congress to pass a specific antipyramid statute. See, e.g., Ella, supra note 50, at 392–93; Note, 
supra note 27, at 1293.  Further, proposed antipyramid legislation has been introduced in the 
U.S. Senate twice but has never successfully passed. Valentine, supra note 20.  This may be 
the result of difficulty in crafting an appropriate definition for illegal pyramid schemes that is 
both precisely targeted but not excessively narrow so as to encourage circumvention. See infra 
note 150 and accompanying text. 
 138. DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 
§ 3.14 (2019–2020 ed.). 
 139. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 327 (West 2020) (prohibiting “[a]ny scheme for the 
disposal or distribution of property whereby a participant pays a valuable consideration for the 
chance to receive compensation for introducing one or more additional persons into 
participation in the scheme”), with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.2582(h) (2020) (“‘Pyramid 
promotional scheme’ means any plan or operation in which an individual gives consideration 
for the opportunity to receive compensation that is derived primarily from recruiting other 
individuals into the plan or operation rather than from the sale of products or services to 
ultimate users or from the consumption or use of products or services by ultimate users.”). 
 140. Federal and state authorities both similarly define a business opportunity as an 
“arrangement[] where a seller solicits a prospective buyer to enter into a business, the 
prospective purchaser makes a required payment, and the seller—expressly or by 
implication—makes certain kinds of claims.” Selling a Work-at-Home or Other Business 
Opportunity?:  Revised Rule May Apply to You, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/selling-work-home-or-other-
business-opportunity-revised-rule [https://perma.cc/BZP7-GV7K]. 
 141. Pareja, supra note 26, at 105. 
 142. Sean Reyes, Learning from the States:  Feds Should Adopt Anti-pyramid Scheme Law, 
HILL (Nov. 19, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/362235-
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Additionally, all fifty states have their own securities laws,143 under which 
state regulators have targeted pyramid schemes for securities fraud or 
violations of state disclosure provisions.144 
However, enforcing state laws against multistate companies is difficult 
because these laws vary widely.145  As a result, companies that might face 
greater liability or disclosure requirements in one state may easily transfer 
their operations across borders.146  This is particularly true given the 
increasing role of technology and the internet in pyramid scheme 
promotion.147  Further, variation among state antipyramid statutes and 
business opportunity laws has produced an uncoordinated regulatory 
effort.148  For legitimate MLM programs, this inconsistency creates 
unpredictability and discourages the growth of economically productive 
businesses.149  Finally, state statutes that narrowly define the term “pyramid 
scheme” may unwittingly provide a roadmap that allows promoters to design 
programs that specifically skirt the definition.150 
Use of state securities laws against pyramids is similarly difficult.151  The 
variation that weakens antipyramid statutes as regulatory tools similarly 
reduces the efficacy of state securities laws in this area.152  Furthermore, in 
1996, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996153 (NSMIA) 
explicitly preempted state securities laws in many ways.154  For instance, 
NSMIA barred the states from imposing registration or reporting 




 143. Adam J. Gana & Michael Villacres, Blue Skies for America in the Securities 
Industry . . . Except for New York:  New York’s Martin Act and the Private Right of Action, 19 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 587, 596 (2014). 
 144. See Liu, supra note 28, at 116. 
 145. Pareja, supra note 26, at 104. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Valentine, supra note 20. 
 148. See Epstein, supra note 22, at 118; Stone, supra note 103, at 893–94; see also Eric 
Witiw, Selling the Right to Sell the Same Right to Sell:  Applying the Consumer Fraud Act, 
the Uniform Securities Law and the Criminal Code to Pyramid Schemes, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1635, 1643–44 (1996). 
 149. See Howie, supra note 23, at 289–90 (noting the ambiguity and uncertainty in the 
application of various state statutes to multilevel marketing plans). 
 150. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES:  A 50-STATE 
REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 11 (2009), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/R75W-7MC8]; 
Frank Mays Hull, Comment, Pyramid Marketing Plans and Consumer Protection:  State and 
Federal Regulation, 21 J. PUB. L. 445, 454 (1972). 
 151. Pareja, supra note 26, at 104–05. 
 152. See Witiw, supra note 148, at 1640–42. 
 153. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
and 29 U.S.C.). 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2018); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 1.24 (7th ed. 2019). 
 155. 15 U.S.C. § 77r. 
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Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998156 also removed most 
securities class actions involving publicly traded securities from state 
courts.157  Moreover, even where these statutes do not explicitly preempt 
state law, courts have frequently held that state laws that conflict with federal 
securities law may be impliedly preempted.158  Accordingly, states currently 
play a greatly diminished role in securities regulation and enforcement.159  In 
sum, while state-level regulation may be useful for targeting localized 
pyramid fraud within state borders, on the whole, it is not a particularly 
effective tool for combatting this national problem. 
2.  The FTC 
On the federal level, the FTC began robust enforcement against pyramids 
in the 1970s, when modern MLM companies began to take shape and 
proliferate.160  Two important cases, Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.161 and 
Amway Corp.,162 helped develop the criteria that the FTC would use to define 
illegal pyramid schemes and to distinguish them from legitimate MLM 
programs.163 
In Koscot, the FTC alleged that the company’s realization of profit was 
predicated upon inducing others, through misrepresentations of potential 
profits, to join the plan.164  However, due to high market saturation and 
exceedingly low market demand for the actual products, those who joined 
after the first few rounds of recruitment were all but guaranteed to lose any 
money they had invested in purchasing the products for resale.165 
The FTC successfully showed that Koscot’s business model was false, 
misleading, and deceptive, and therefore it constituted an unfair act and 
practice.166  The administrative law judge thus held that unlawful pyramids 
are characterized by payments by participants “in return for which they 
receive (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the right to receive in return for 
recruiting other participants into the program rewards which are unrelated to 
 
 156. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 157. HAZEN, supra note 154, § 1.24. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the 
JOBS Act, 66 DUKE L.J. 605, 613–14 (2016).  State regulation may nonetheless still be useful 
for more localized fraud, and states still retain some jurisdiction over certain securities actions. 
HAZEN, supra note 154, § 1.24.  For instance, class actions implicating securities that are not 
publicly traded may still be heard in state court. Id. 
 160. Jessica Sweeb, Health Multi-level Marketing:  Robbing People of Their Money and 
Their Health, 27 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 223, 228 (2018). 
 161. 86 F.T.C. 1106 (1975). 
 162. 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979). 
 163. Sweeb, supra note 160, at 228–30. 
 164. Koscot, 86 F.T.C. at 1112. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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the sale of the product to ultimate users.”167  The FTC continues to use this 
definition today.168 
In stating that the program was not a pyramid and did not engage in 
deceptive business practices, the Amway decision provided guideposts for 
distinguishing between illegal pyramids and legitimate MLM programs.169  
The decision emphasized three of Amway’s company policies and concluded 
that such policies provided sufficient consumer protection safeguards.  First, 
Amway had a policy of buying back goods of distributors leaving the 
program.170  Second, Amway required that distributors make sales to at least 
ten unique customers each month.171  And third, distributors were required 
to sell 70 percent of the product they purchased each month to customers 
outside the Amway program.172 
In the years since Amway, those three policies have become known as the 
Amway safeguards rule.173  Legitimate MLM companies have generally 
been able to limit much of their potential FTC liability by incorporating 
Amway’s policies into their business models.174  The FTC’s regulatory 
approach to pyramid schemes has also remained consistent in the decades 
since Koscot and Amway.175  The agency continues to rely heavily—if not 
exclusively—on case-by-case adjudication and enforcement.176 
Though the FTC has had some success in taking down large pyramid 
schemes, several major obstacles prevent effective FTC regulation and 
enforcement.  First, shutting down a scheme under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914 is difficult, time-consuming, and costly.177  
Proving, for instance, that a company affirmatively misrepresented its 
earning potential is a highly fact-intensive process that requires significant 
agency resources.178  Moreover, pyramids and fraudsters have proven 
capable of adapting and innovating to evade detection, which has made the 
FTC’s cases even harder to prove.179  Additionally, by the time pyramid 
schemes achieve the size and visibility necessary to attract FTC attention, 
 
 167. Id. at 1180. 
 168. See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-level Marketing, supra note 82. 
 169. See Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979). 
 170. Pareja, supra note 26, at 95. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Babener, supra note 18, at 24. 
 174. See id.  
 175. See Pareja, supra note 26, at 88–90. 
 176. See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-level Marketing, supra note 82 (explaining 
that the commission engages in case-by-case enforcement and adjudication, rather than 
prescriptive rulemaking). 
 177. Walsh, supra note 20, at 588. 
 178. See Note, supra note 27, at 1272 n.99; see also Pareja, supra note 26, at 95–96 
(explaining that companies are careful to protect against claims of misrepresentation by 
trumpeting the success of the few at the top of the pyramid while including generic and bare 
disclaimers); Walsh, supra note 20, at 591 (observing that FTC adjudication requires “lengthy 
and complicated factual analyses that use balancing tests, percentages, and somewhat arbitrary 
ratios”). 
 179. See FTC v. BurnLounge, Inc., 753 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing the district 
court’s description of the BurnLounge bonus system as a “labyrinth of obfuscation”). 
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most stakeholders have already incurred significant losses that they are 
unlikely to recoup.180 
Finally, the FTC only has the authority to bring civil charges against 
pyramid operators.181  Accordingly, the consequences of FTC violations, 
though sometimes significant, are limited to financial loss.182  Because 
enforcement actions are lengthy and not guaranteed,183 the overall deterrent 
effect of FTC enforcement has been somewhat weak.184 
3.  The SEC 
The SEC became concerned about pyramid schemes around the same time 
that the FTC did.185  In November 1971, the agency issued a landmark 
release, which detailed its view that the operation of a pyramid scheme may 
involve the offering of a security under the Securities Act of 1933.186  Where 
pyramid schemes are classified as securities, there are several important 
consequences.187  First, promoters of pyramid securities are required to 
register any agreement between the company and potential investors with the 
SEC.188  Second, investors recruiting or soliciting others in exchange for a 
commission or other compensation need to be brokers, as defined by the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act.189  Third, deceptive acts or practices connected to 
the sale or offer to participate are subject to securities antifraud provisions.190  
Further, under the ambit of the federal securities laws, pyramid profits may 
be subject to disgorgement.191  Although the SEC has no authority to require 
a violator of the securities laws to make restitution, in injunction actions, the 
agency has frequently been successful in securing orders requiring 
disgorgement of profits as ancillary relief.192  These funds are then held in a 
depository and distributed to victims entitled to recovery.193  The SEC may 
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also issue disgorgement orders against securities violators.194  The 
application of these regulatory tools is, however, necessarily dependent upon 
pyramid schemes meeting the federal definition of “security.”195 
The history and background of the federal securities regime offer useful 
context for examining the interpretation and application of the federal 
securities laws to pyramid schemes.  Federal securities regulation emerged 
in the wake of the infamous stock market crash of 1929.196  In this period, 
Congress was particularly concerned that, due to unchecked fraud, investors 
had been duped into funneling money into spurious companies.197  In 
response, it used state “blue sky laws”198 as a model for a federal securities 
regime.199 
With the aim of protecting the investing public, Congress devised a broad 
statutory definition for a security, which covers a variety of financial 
instruments and investment opportunities.200  Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme 
Court construed the term “security” within the 1933 Securities Act to 
“include by name or description many documents in which there is a common 
trading for speculation or investment.”201  The Court recognized that some 
instruments, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, have well-settled meaning.202  
However, descriptive designations or catchall terms, such as “investment 
contract,” may reach “novel, uncommon, or irregular devices” so long as the 
device generally involves a contribution of capital with the intention to earn 
income or profit from its use.203 
Though pyramid schemes do not fall within the meanings of any of the 
well-settled statutory terms such as “stock” or “bond,” the SEC has argued 
that pyramids are securities because they constitute investment contracts.204  
However, the term “investment contract,” though included in the statutory 
list of instruments that may be securities, is not defined by statute.205  
Therefore, in SEC v. W.J. Howey & Co.,206 the Supreme Court articulated a 
test for determining whether an investment contract exists within the 
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meaning of the federal securities laws.207  The Court held that “an investment 
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction, or 
scheme whereby a person,” (1) “invests his money,” (2) “in a common 
enterprise,” and (3) “is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party.”208 
The Howey Court emphasized the need for flexibility in interpreting the 
term “investment contract” to ensure that the federal securities laws fulfilled 
their purpose of generously protecting investors.209  For instance, the Court 
approved of the prevailing state court approach, which disregarded form for 
substance and emphasized economic reality.210  Moreover, the Court noted 
that the federal securities regime was based on states’ blue sky laws.211  
Therefore, the Court reasoned that Congress intended that the term 
“investment contract,” under federal law, be given the same well-settled and 
flexible meaning it had under state laws.212  Such state laws were primarily 
concerned with protecting investors from fraudulent securities schemes, not 
with precisely demarcating all possible variations that might arise in capital 
markets.213 
As discussed more thoroughly below, the SEC has had varying success 
convincing courts that pyramids involve the sale of securities.  Nonetheless, 
the SEC does regularly bring enforcement actions against pyramids, 
primarily alleging the use of materially false or misleading statements.214 
II.  WHEN A PYRAMID IS ALSO A SECURITY:  DIFFERENT TESTS FOR 
FINDING AN “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” 
When courts find that a pyramid involved the sale of securities, a variety 
of new enforcement mechanisms become available.215  First, the scheme’s 
top-level promoters may face liability for the sale of unregistered 
securities216 or for material misrepresentations and omissions in the sale of 
such securities.217  Further, as material misrepresentations constitute fraud, 
individuals may be subject to criminal liability under federal mail and wire 
fraud statutes.218  Finally, classification as a security allows defrauded 
scheme participants to bring private actions against the pyramid’s promoters 
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and organizers under the PSLRA.219  Such penalties represent significant 
deterrents to the formation and operation of pyramid schemes.220 
The enforcement mechanisms available under federal securities law, 
however, are not available in every case because the courts have employed 
inconsistent reasoning when determining the existence of an investment 
contract.221  As explained above, the Howey test is the definitive rule for 
identifying an investment contract within the meaning of the federal 
securities laws.222  On the state level, however, the risk capital approach has 
developed as an alternative to the Howey test.223  Part II illustrates the 
development of these two different tests and the application of each test to 
pyramid schemes alleged to be securities. 
A.  Application of the Howey Test to Pyramid Schemes 
For pyramid schemes, the third prong of Howey is usually the most 
difficult to satisfy.224  The third prong asks whether the investor expected 
that profits would be derived “solely from the efforts of the promoter or a 
third party.”225  In the wake of Howey, some commentators noted that the use 
of the word “solely” was problematic because it provided a means for 
avoiding literal application of the test.226  Because the Howey test ostensibly 
failed to protect investors who contributed a modicum of effort, schemes 
could implement a requirement of nominal participation and thus avoid 
securities laws.227 
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1.  Liberalization of Howey’s “Efforts of Others” Prong 
In the years after Howey, several lower courts lessened the restrictiveness 
of the third prong of the test.228  In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 
(Glenn Turner I),229 the SEC brought suit against Glenn Turner’s company, 
Dare to Be Great, which sold self-improvement courses through MLM 
distribution.230  The company defendants argued that the third prong of 
Howey was not met.231  They pointed to the fact that at the initial sales 
meetings for the program, investors were given the opportunity to recruit 
others and were told of the importance of their efforts.232  Accordingly, the 
defendants asserted, participants were not led to expect that profits would 
flow solely from the efforts of others.233 
The court, nonetheless, found that the scheme constituted an investment 
contract for three reasons.  First, any business skills an investor may have 
had were far less important than his or her ability to pay for the plan.234  
Second, the investor’s primary, if not sole, responsibility was to bring new 
people to attend recruitment meetings.235  Third, the success or failure of the 
program was entirely dependent on the business decisions of the high-level 
company managers.236  In sum, because the company and its top-level 
organizers, not the individual participants, performed the essential 
managerial tasks, the court concluded that Turner’s plan constituted an 
investment contract.237 
In its analysis, the Glenn Turner I court approved of the approach 
developed by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country Club v. 
Sobieski.238  In Silver Hills, the state court focused on the economic reality 
of a security, finding that fundamentally, a security involves “investors [who] 
subject their money to the risk of an enterprise over which they exercise no 
managerial control.”239  The Glenn Turner I court reasoned, in the same vein, 
that because the parent company ultimately remained responsible for all 
managerial decisions and responsibilities, the investor-participants were 
entitled to the protections of the federal securities law.240 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Dare to Be Great indeed offered 
investment contracts under a properly liberal reading of the Howey test.241  
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In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. (Glenn Turner II),242 the court 
found that the “solely” requirement “should not be read as a strict or literal 
limitation on the definition of an investment contract.”243  Rather, the test 
should be read realistically “so as to include within the definition those 
schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities.”244  This is 
particularly so in light of the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws, 
the policy of broadly protecting the public, and the Supreme Court’s mandate 
that securities should be defined flexibly.245  The Ninth Circuit thus relaxed 
the meaning of “solely,” asking instead “whether the efforts made by those 
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential 
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”246  
Similarly, in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,247 the Fifth Circuit 
conducted a careful analysis of the Howey decision and the authority relied 
upon by the Supreme Court in developing the test.248  It concluded that 
“solely” should not be read literally.249  Importantly, the court recognized 
that too literal an interpretation of the Howey test would frustrate, rather than 
serve, the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws.250 
This more functional approach to Howey is now the majority position.251  
Using this test, however, federal courts have come to varying conclusions 
about whether pyramids constitute securities.252 
2.  Differing Interpretations of Managerial Efforts 
While the circuits have liberalized the last prong of Howey, the courts still 
differ with respect to the quantity and quality of efforts made by the investor 
that will preclude a finding of a security under the test.253 
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For instance, in Kerrigan v. ViSalus, Inc.,254 the court focused extensively 
on the breadth of activities that the scheme promoters represented would be 
required of distributors who desired success in the program.255  The case 
dealt with a multilevel retailer of powdered weight loss shakes and associated 
products.256  The court began its discussion by concluding that, because of 
the emphasis that ViSalus placed on recruitment, the market for the products 
was saturated.257  As such, nearly all of the distributors who had joined 
between 2010 and 2013 lost their money.258  The court concluded that, 
because of the focus on recruitment and its compensation structure, the 
ViSalus program was a pyramid scheme.259  However, in moving to the 
securities question, the court concluded that it could not find, as a matter of 
law, that the final Howey prong was satisfied.260  In particular, the court 
looked to the company’s statements, which detailed the various marketing, 
administrative, and sales activities distributors might engage in.261  
Moreover, in all of its promotional materials, ViSalus heavily emphasized 
the role that individual distributors would play in their own success.262  
Despite noting that ViSalus directly provided distributors with essential 
marketing materials and training, the court found it significant that ViSalus 
represented that it offered participants a great degree of freedom in choosing 
how to promote or sell the products or the program.263  Accordingly, the court 
held that it was not clear that the distributors’ efforts were insignificant and 
that, therefore, the Howey test was not met.264  The Kerrigan court’s 
reasoning exemplifies the approach to Howey that looks primarily to the 
amount of work expected of a potential investor, as represented to them by 
the program promoters and promotional or recruitment materials.265 
Other courts, however, have focused more specifically on whether the 
work of participants is largely ministerial or managerial.266  For example, in 
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Mitzner v. Cardet International, Inc.,267 the court acknowledged the role of 
the distributors and area managers in the company’s MLM product delivery 
program.268  Like in Kerrigan, the court further recognized that the 
participant agreements reflected an expectation that participants were 
responsible for recruiting others, distributing brochures, picking up orders, 
and delivering goods sold.269  Nonetheless, the Mitzner decision turned on 
the court’s conclusion that the participants’ efforts were purely ministerial.270  
In particular, despite the fact that the participants’ success was dependent 
upon their performance of certain tasks, the court underscored that the 
company was responsible for selecting the type, quality, and nature of goods 
sold, as well as providing marketing and advertising materials.271  The 
distributors and area managers were therefore bound by the rules and 
procedures set by the company and not empowered to make meaningful or 
independent business decisions.272 
Accordingly, even though the participants were told explicitly to expect to 
make significant efforts, the Mitzner court found that the third prong of 
Howey was not satisfied because such efforts were ministerial, not 
managerial.273  However, the respective responsibilities of the company and 
of the distributors in Mitzner closely resembled the facts in Kerrigan.  
Nonetheless, the two courts came to opposite conclusions regarding the 
existence of a security.274  Such cases reflect courts’ inconsistent application 
of Howey’s third prong to pyramid schemes. 
B.  Risk Capital Analysis and the Hawaii Market Center Test 
In response to the perceived rigidity of the Howey test, state courts began 
to formulate alternative investment contract tests.275  One such alternative, 
the “risk capital test,” has been articulated in several different ways by both 
federal and state courts.276  However, all of the variations derive from a 
common notion that the “subjection of the buyer’s initial value to the risks of 
an enterprise with which he is not familiar and over which he exercises no 
control seems to be the ‘economic reality’ which most clearly creates a need 
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for the special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies of the securities 
laws.”277 
1.  The Development of Risk Capital Analysis 
Justice Roger J. Traynor is generally credited with articulating the first risk 
capital analysis in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, which arose as an 
action under California’s securities laws.278  There, the defendants sought 
capital to develop and finance a country club by selling memberships in the 
club.279  Under the developers’ plan, the cost of a membership increased as 
the club grew and new facilities were added.280  Members were responsible 
for monthly dues and had no rights to the club’s income or assets.281  Yet, 
membership entitled investors to use all club facilities, except for the golf 
course, and membership could only be transferred to individuals approved 
by the club’s board of directors.282  The club developers argued that 
memberships were simply contracts for the sale of personal recreational 
services.283  Accordingly, they posited that the memberships did not fall 
within the scope of the securities laws because they were not purchased for 
investment.284 
Nevertheless, Justice Traynor concluded that securities protection was 
intended “to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of 
realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures.”285  The membership 
therefore constituted a security because the benefits of membership would 
only be realized if investors, along with other purchasers, subjected their 
capital to the risks of the enterprise.286  Even though the interest was labeled 
a membership, the risk of loss was no different than that of a stock, bond, or 
note.287  In sum, Silver Hills introduced the idea that, where capital solicited 
from investors is subjected to the risks of an enterprise, the risk of loss is 
shifted to members of the public, who are then entitled to the protections of 
the securities laws.288 
The rationale from Silver Hills was further refined by the Hawaii Supreme 
Court in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.289  In Hawaii Market Center, 
the court faced a “founder-membership” plan similar to the one in Silver 
Hills:  the defendants sought to open a retail store that would only sell goods 
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to individuals who had purchased authorization cards.290  To finance the 
development of the store, the promoters recruited “founder-members.”291  To 
become a founder-member, one would purchase either a sewing machine or 
a cookware set, each with a $70 wholesale value, for $320.292  In return, the 
member received:  authorization to shop at the store once it became 
operational, fifty authorized buyer’s cards to be distributed by the investor to 
others, the right to earn a 10 percent commission on any sale made by 
shoppers using one of the investor’s distributed cards, as well as fees and 
compensation for bringing others into the program as founder-members or 
higher-level distributors.293 
In determining whether the scheme constituted a security, the Hawaii 
Market Center court rejected the Howey test, arguing that it fostered a 
mechanical and narrow notion of investor participation.294  Fundamentally, 
the court reasoned that, under the Howey formula, courts become entrapped 
in semantics and fail to consider the overriding question of whether the 
protection of the securities laws should apply to the enterprise in question.295  
Instead, the court held that, for purposes of the Hawaii Uniform Securities 
Act, 
[A]n investment contract is created whenever: 
(1) an offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and 
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, 
and 
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror’s promises 
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a 
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue 
to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and 
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual 
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.296 
Particularly significant for the issue of pyramid schemes was the 
observation that courts should concentrate on the quality of participation and 
the degree of control over the enterprise exercised as a function of that 
participation.297 
 
 290. Id. at 107. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 108. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 109. 
 297. Id. at 111.  This concept has been incorporated by case law or statute by several states. 
See, e.g., NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Grubb & Ellis Co., No. 10-CVS-4392, 
2016 WL 7489690, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2016); King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 324 
(Tenn. 2002) (concluding that the Hawaii Market Center test is preferable because, inter alia, 
it puts the requirement of managerial control in explicit, more easily comprehensible terms). 
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2.  Reception by the Federal Courts 
Although Howey remains the definitive rule, many federal courts 
recognize risk capital analysis as a useful tool for defining various forms of 
securities.298  With respect to investment contracts and the “efforts of others” 
prong, the court in SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp.299 observed that the 
theory underlying the Silver Hills and Hawaii Market Center risk capital tests 
could be used to further define or refine investor passivity or dependence 
under Howey.300  Moreover, it concluded that the risk capital concept helped 
to distinguish between enterprises that appear more like a traditional offer to 
invest—because the risk of loss is dependent upon the competence of 
others—from those in which the investor buys the right to conduct a business 
and exercises practical control over his or her resources.301 
Similarly, in determining whether the defendant’s MLM business was a 
pyramid and an investment contract, the court in In re Bestline Products 
Securities & Antitrust Litigation302 applied the Howey test but engaged in a 
lengthy discussion regarding the significance of risk that the individual 
distributors assumed as a function of their relationship to the company.303  
Significantly, in its analysis of Howey’s third prong, the court thoroughly 
considered the degree of control retained by distributors and the relationship 
of the distributor’s control to their chances of success, as opposed to simply 
the nature or extent of their efforts.304 
The concept of risk capital has also been employed to determine whether 
a promissory note may be classified as a security.305  Some courts look to the 
degree of risk, subject to the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others, 
when distinguishing between promissory notes for ordinary commercial 
loans and investments that fall under the protection of the securities acts.306  
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit uses a risk capital approach when asking 
whether, under Howey, the efforts of general partners are insignificant 
enough to warrant finding a security.307  Under that approach, the third prong 
 
 298. See, e.g., Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. 
River City Steak, 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff’d, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 299. 524 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 300. Id. at 866, 878. 
 301. Id. 
 302. 412 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Fla. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Piambino v. Bailey (In re Bestline 
Prods. Sec. & Antitrust Litig.), 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 303. Id. at 750–53. 
 304. Id. at 751–52 (“The class Plaintiffs are not manufacturers or producers of soap, and 
the terms and conditions of their participation in the Bestline National Marketing Plan are 
controlled by Bestline . . . .  Bestline’s failure would not only render its distributorships 
worthless, but would effectively put the distributor out of business as a separate or independent 
entity.”). 
 305. See, e.g., Great W. Bank & Tr. v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1256–57 (9th Cir. 1976); 
C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1249 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 306. See, e.g., Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1988); Great W. Bank, 
532 F.2d at 1256–57; Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff’d, 701 
F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 307. E.g., SEC v. Arcturus Corp., 928 F.3d 400, 410–11 (5th Cir. 2019).  For a discussion 
of the significance of the “efforts of others” prong in the context of general partnerships, see 
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of Howey is satisfied when:  (1) the parties’ agreement gives so little power 
to the partner that it in fact distributes power in the same way as a limited 
partnership; or (2) the partner so lacks experience and knowledge of business 
affairs that he is not capable of intelligently exercising his partnership 
powers; or (3) the partner so heavily depends on the unique entrepreneurial 
or managerial skills of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace that 
promoter or manager, or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership 
power.308 
Further, the SEC has endorsed the risk capital formulation set out in 
Hawaii Market Center as applicable to the federal securities laws and 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the remedial character of 
the federal securities acts.309  Significantly, the SEC noted that a security 
exists where the responsibilities or powers of the investor have little direct 
effect on their receipt of promised benefits.310  Further, the SEC urged that 
even the performance of financially significant duties, which manifestly 
contribute to the success of the venture, may not alter the security analysis if 
the investor lacks significant control over the use of his investment.311 
Nonetheless, despite its acceptance on the state level and the use and 
discussion of risk capital analysis on the federal level, no risk capital test has 
formally been adopted to replace Howey.312  Further, given the opportunity, 
in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,313 the Supreme Court 
declined to adopt a risk capital analysis.314 
The Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility of adopting a risk 
capital test in a more appropriate case.315  Rather, the Court observed that in 
the Forman fact pattern, it was clear that the plaintiffs had not taken on any 
significant risk because they were able to recover their investment in full at 
any time.316  Therefore, if the Court were inclined to apply the risk capital 
test, it would not do so in the instant case.317  However, as the Ninth Circuit 
 
Douglas M. Fried, Note, General Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Federal 
Securities Laws:  Substance over Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (1985). 
 308. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 309. Release, supra note 186, at 23,290 (stating the commission’s position that the 
conclusion of the Hawaii Market Center court is fully consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
remedial approach to interpretation of the federal securities laws). 
 310. Id. at 23,289. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See Pareja, supra note 26, at 100.  Further, there is some disagreement among the 
federal courts as to whether risk capital analysis should be employed only when assessing 
investments made as part of initial capitalization. HAZEN, supra note 154, § 1:55; see also Sec. 
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 313. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
 314. Id. at 857. 
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 316. Id. at 857 n.24. 
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pointed out in Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,318 the Supreme Court 
has used a form of risk capital analysis to distinguish between annuity 
investment contracts, which are covered by the securities laws, and insurance 
contracts, which are exempt from registration requirements.319 
III.  JOINING FORCES:  A COMBINED HOWEY–HAWAII MARKET CENTER TEST 
As this Note has illustrated, pyramid fraud in the United States is 
substantial and difficult to regulate.320  Victims’ documented reticence to 
come forward also exacerbates the problem, impeding government actors 
from detecting and shutting down illegal pyramids.321  The federal securities 
laws are fruitful and promising avenues for enforcement.322  Classification 
as a security brings with it significant liability and regulatory costs, as well 
as the possibility of criminal penalties.323  Therefore, where pyramid scheme 
promoters believe that their schemes will fall within the ambit of the federal 
securities laws, they are more likely to be deterred from forming such 
schemes in the first instance.324  Additionally, the increased availability of 
securities enforcement actions would make it more likely that victims would 
recover their losses because the SEC may seek disgorgement of profits.325 
Yet, despite the liberalization of Howey’s “efforts of others” prong, as the 
discussion in Part II demonstrated, there continues to be inconsistency among 
the federal courts as to how to categorize and analyze the efforts of pyramid 
scheme participants and distributors.326  Accordingly, the application of the 
federal securities laws to pyramid schemes remains unsettled.  Moreover, 
under Howey’s third prong, several pyramid schemes have escaped the reach 
of the federal securities laws, despite bearing the economic characteristics of 
securities.327  As a result, pyramid scheme formation is not effectively 
deterred by the federal securities laws. 
Part III.A argues that pyramid schemes bear the fundamental economic 
characteristics of securities and that pyramid fraud is precisely the kind of 
 
 318. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 319. Id. at 1257 n.2 (first citing SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 
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(D. Mass. 2019). 
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v. Holtzclaw, 950 F. Supp. 1306, 1313, 1317 (S.D.W. Va. 1997). 
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deceptive investment opportunity that securities law was designed to target.  
In Part III.B, this Note further argues that Howey’s third prong leads to both 
inconsistent and unprincipled results when applied to pyramid schemes and 
that it is not a useful analytical tool in that context.  Part III.C urges the federal 
courts to replace the “efforts of others” prong from Howey with the final 
prong of the Hawaii Market Center test in cases involving alleged pyramids.  
Finally in Part III.D, this Note demonstrates why this combined Howey–
Hawaii Market Center test produces more principled results that are 
consonant with the purposes, policies, and spirit of federal securities 
regulation. 
A.  Why Securities Protections Should Properly Be Applied to Pyramid 
Schemes 
Congress enacted the securities laws to broadly protect the investing public 
from meaningful misstatements, omissions, and fraud.328  The history of 
securities regulation reveals that the laws are most principally concerned with 
investor manipulation and victimization.329  From the beginning, the aim was 
to require disclosure of material information, ensuring that both investors and 
the marketplace had sufficient information to make intelligent investment 
decisions.330 
While the federal securities laws are not a broad remedy for all forms of 
fraud, pyramid schemes bear all of the hallmarks of the misleading 
investment fraud that these laws were designed to protect against.  Pyramids 
are fundamentally money transfer schemes.331  Thus, they do not generate 
genuine economic value because they do not produce revenue through the 
sale of goods or services.332  Rather, they almost invariably involve 
fraudulent misrepresentations and cause financial losses to the great majority 
of those that sign up to participate.333  Further, the convoluted and obfuscated 
nature and structure of such schemes makes it incredibly difficult for the 
average potential participant to adequately assess the risk of loss or the 
legality of the venture.334  In sum, pyramids possess all of the evils that the 
federal securities laws were intended to cure:  fraud, misrepresentation, 
deceptive and spurious investments, and inadequate disclosure.335 
 
 328. Bundy, supra note 23, at 124. 
 329. Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:  Opting out of 
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 332. See Bosley & Knorr, supra note 73, at 82; Valentine, supra note 20. 
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B.  The Relationship Between Investor Effort and Investor Control 
The history and emphasis of the federal securities laws reflect the notion 
that governmental protection of investors is warranted where the investor is 
involved and, therefore, informed.336  Securities law’s heavy emphasis on 
disclosure is based on the notion that investors are adequately protected when 
all relevant aspects of an investment are fully and fairly communicated.337  
Such disclosure offers investors the means to evaluate the merits of an 
investment opportunity themselves.338  It follows that the danger of fraud is 
considerably lessened when the investor subjects capital to an enterprise over 
which he exercises meaningful control because such an investor also 
inevitably remains informed of material information about his investment.339 
Thus, the “efforts of others” prong does not separate passive from active 
investors for its own sake.340  Rather, it is a means to identify investors who 
retain no direct control over the policy decisions affecting their funds, in 
which case the law should force disclosure of material information about the 
enterprise.341  Where, on the other hand, the investor exercises meaningful 
control through participation, there is less of a need for governmental 
protection342 and the need for forced disclosure of information to enable an 
investor to make an intelligent decision about the soundness of an enterprise 
is significantly reduced.343 
The move away from the word “solely” in the Howey test reflects this 
notion.344  As the Supreme Court has long recognized, Congress intentionally 
defined “security” in general terms.345  Congress also acknowledged the 
boundlessness of possible schemes that might arise in capital markets.346  
The securities laws, therefore, include descriptive phrases, like “investment 
contract,” that are broad and flexible enough to carry out the acts’ remedial 
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purposes and afford full protection to the investing public.347  A literal 
reading of the word “solely” is therefore inconsistent with the view that 
inquiries into the existence of a security should be flexible and centered on 
economic realities.348  On the other hand, risk of loss without control is one 
of the essential characteristics of the economic reality of a security.349  This 
notion can be traced back to SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,350 where the 
Supreme Court recognized that the degree to which the buyer’s investment 
was tied to the success of the enterprise was critically relevant to the buyer’s 
need for the protection of the federal securities laws.351 
The economic reality of pyramid schemes is that participants make 
investments—sometimes substantial ones—and yet, returns are based on the 
continuous recruitment of new participants and mathematically 
unsupportable geometric progression.352  Since participants have no control 
over the model, distributors’ returns are based, to a substantial degree, on the 
decisions and efforts of others.353  Accordingly, the extent, nature, and 
quality of a participant’s efforts frequently have no bearing on the success of 
their investment.354 
Howey’s final prong, which courts have generally read to inquire into the 
quantity and quality of efforts, therefore, makes little sense in the context of 
pyramid schemes.355  In illegal pyramids, a participant may devote himself 
tirelessly to the sale of a sham product and the development of a customer 
base and management of a business.356  Yet, his returns still turn on market 
saturation and downline recruitment.357  Thus in a pyramid scheme, an 
investor may very well contribute managerial or essential efforts, and yet, 
such efforts are no protection against the risk of loss inherent in the scheme 
or the lack of information about the true nature of the program.358  Regardless 
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of how much effort a pyramid scheme requires of distributors, those efforts 
rarely ever determine their returns; the primary factor that determines 
whether a pyramid participant earns money is the time at which they enter 
the scheme.359 
C.  Harmonizing Howey and Hawaii Market Center:  Incorporating 
Practical and Actual Control 
In the context of pyramid schemes, incorporating the fourth prong of the 
Hawaii Market Center test, which focuses on investor control, would bring 
the Howey test into accord with the purposes of the federal securities laws 
and would further the goal of investor protection. 
The final prong of the Hawaii Market Center test requires that “the offeree 
does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the 
managerial decisions of the enterprise.”360  As applied, this test focuses on 
practical and actual managerial control as opposed to managerial efforts.361  
For instance, in Wieboldt v. Metz,362 the district court discussed the 
application of the risk capital test to a franchise agreement.363  The court 
noted that in a typical franchise, the franchisee has decision-making power 
over choices that affect the economic viability of his enterprise.364  In 
contrast, under the risk capital test, where the franchisee exercises no 
meaningful control over his venture, an investment contract exists.365  
Similarly, in Securities Administrator v. College Assistance Plan (Guam), 
Inc.,366 the court adopted the Hawaii Market Center test, reasoning that the 
test was more concerned with practical and actual control, recognizing the 
importance of weighing not just the degree but also the effect of investor 
participation.367 
If courts evaluating an alleged pyramid scheme focus on whether the 
investor retained control to influence the success of his investment, they can 
avoid the danger of arbitrarily excluding certain schemes from the protection 
of the federal securities laws.368  For many investment vehicles, such as the 
 
 359. See Whitford, supra note 94, at 694. 
 360. State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971). 
 361. See Note, supra note 27, at 1286 (arguing that the Hawaii Market Center test 
overcame some of the limitations of the Howey test by examining investor control, rather than 
investor effort, in the production of profit). 
 362. 355 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 363. Id. at 259–60. 
 364. Id. at 260. 
 365. Id. 
 366. 533 F. Supp. 118 (D. Guam 1981). 
 367. Id. at 123.  Some courts have commented that there is no longer a meaningful 
difference between the final prong of Howey and the final prong of the Hawaii Market Center 
test because Howey has been made more flexible subsequent to the Koscot and the Glenn 
Turner cases.  However, the distinction between efforts or labor and control “does become 
important with the development of new plans specifically drafted to fall just beyond the Howey 
definition.” Long, supra note 336, at 176. 
 368. See Long, supra note 336, at 145 (noting that after Howey, courts almost unanimously 
interpreted efforts to mean any effort by the investor, regardless of the bearing it had on control 
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one presented in Howey itself, efforts—or lack thereof—made by the 
investor are closely correlated to the control and knowledge of the 
investor.369  However, in pyramids, investors may retain formalistic control 
and exercise significant efforts, yet these efforts do not influence their 
success in the scheme.370  Therefore, with respect to alleged pyramids, it is 
more useful to ask not how significant the efforts were but rather whether 
those efforts had any impact on the investor’s return or lack thereof. 
Accordingly, a combined Howey–Hawaii Market Center test better serves 
the policies underlying Howey:  emphasis on economic reality, flexibility, 
and protecting investors from fraudulent schemes that are not easily 
detected.371  Because pyramids are subject to greater variation than other 
forms of investment contracts and not as easily categorized, it makes sense 
for courts to use a test that better captures the harm seeking to be prevented 
or remediated.372 
This tailoring is already a common approach among lower courts when 
they are confronted with investment vehicles that are difficult to analyze or 
whose nature may be influenced by a number of variables.373  There is 
evidence that courts already vary the focus of their analysis of Howey’s last 
prong, often emphasizing control over efforts, when the specific facts call for 
such an analytical departure.374  For example, looking at a sale-leaseback 
program in Albanese v. Florida National Bank of Orlando,375 the Eleventh 
Circuit found that a scheme whereby investors purchased ice machines, and 
then agreed to lease them back to the sellers, constituted a security.376  In that 
case, the defendant-sellers pointed to the fact that the investors retained the 
right to:  reject the selected locations, receive a regular accounting of 
expenses and collections, and terminate the agreements under specified 
conditions.377  The defendants posited that as a result of the investors’ rights 
and responsibilities, Howey’s third prong was not met.378  The court, 
however, recognized that despite the investors having retained formal 
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responsibilities by the terms of the agreement, their control was illusory.379  
Due to the nature of the arrangement, the investors had no realistic alternative 
to allowing the company to manage their investments.380 
Finally, the combined test is consistent with the principles underlying the 
original Howey test.381  Howey excluded the active investor from the 
disclosure and fraud protections of the securities laws, at least in part, 
because an investor does not need such protection where he exercises 
managerial control and therefore has access to information about the 
issuer.382  In the case of pyramids, however, the fact that the investor 
participates does not in fact give him access to crucial information about the 
enterprise.383  There is, therefore, little reason to exclude such an investor 
from the protection of the federal securities laws.384 
D.  Clarity and Consistency:  Applying the Combined Test 
The proposed test provides a clearer, more concrete, and consistent 
standard.  It better captures the differences between legitimate MLM 
companies and illegal pyramids and also leads to more analytical harmony.  
Such consistency and predictability in the law benefits legitimate businesses 
and also better protects the public from illegitimate, fraudulent schemes. 
First, the most principled distinction between legitimate MLM companies 
and illegal pyramids is whether or not revenue is based primarily on the 
continuous recruitment of new members.385  Overall continuous recruitment 
is a factor almost entirely outside the control of the individual participant.386  
On the other hand, if there is an opportunity to earn income from the sale of 
a marketable product, the participant has substantial control over his success 
in the enterprise and thus does not subject capital to the common risk pool to 
the same extent.387  Thus, adopting the control prong of the Hawaii Market 
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Center test does a better job of incorporating this distinction between 
legitimate MLM companies and illegal pyramids into the law and draws a 
more useful line. 
Second, the utility of the proposed test can be further demonstrated by 
reevaluating the two divergent cases introduced in Part II, Kerrigan v. 
ViSalus, Inc. and Mitzner v. Cardet International, Inc.388  If the facts of both 
cases are evaluated using the combined test, the results and reasoning become 
concordant.  In Kerrigan, the scheme would pass the final prong of the 
proposed combined test because, while the distributors were expected to 
actively recruit others, the facts show that the defendants controlled all 
relevant aspects of the program and structure.389  The plaintiffs received no 
right to exercise actual or practical control because they were bound by the 
sales and recruitment structure and policies.390  As the record reflected, a 
distributor could only generate at most a token income by retailing product, 
yet recruitment bonuses enabled the same distributor to earn hundreds of 
dollars simply by enrolling a new recruit in the program.391  Therefore, each 
distributor, for all practical purposes, was only able to generate a return based 
on rewards for recruitment.392  Unfortunately, that emphasis on recruitment 
quickly produced market saturation and made it impossible for the great 
majority of participants to earn such rewards, regardless of their extensive 
efforts or activities.393  These facts precluded a return on investment, 
regardless of how hard each distributor worked to recruit new participants.394  
Therefore, ViSalus investors did not have the right to exercise practical or 
actual control under Hawaii Market Center, satisfying the final prong of the 
combined test. 
Similarly, in Mitzner, the scheme would pass the final prong of the 
combined test, not because the participants’ efforts were ministerial but 
rather because they were not entitled to exert any significant control over the 
managerial decisions of the enterprise.395  In other words, the participants 
were not empowered “to make any meaningful or independent business 
decisions” that would impact the success of their investment.396  Instead of 
focusing on the distinction between managerial and ministerial tasks, asking 
whether the participants lacked control over their investment’s success 
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provides a clearer analytical frame that is easier to apply and produces 
consistent results between the two cases.397 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of pyramid fraud is only growing.  Despite the investment of 
significant governmental resources, undeterred fraudsters continue to form 
new pyramid schemes with growing regularity.  The federal securities laws 
were enacted to protect the public from precisely these kinds of 
unsubstantiated, misleading, and fraudulent investment opportunities.  
However, courts inconsistently applying the Howey test continue to draw 
unprincipled lines and exclude pyramid schemes from the ambit of the 
federal securities laws based on the red herring of investor efforts.  This Note 
argues not that the federal courts should ignore the role played by distributors 
in pyramid schemes but rather that they should focus attention on the degree 
of control that investors may exercise as a function of that participation.  By 
incorporating the language of the final prong of the Hawaii Market Center 
test, the courts may more directly identify the economic reality of an alleged 
pyramid scheme.  In so doing, they can better effectuate the vital aim of 
protecting the investing public whenever the fundamental characteristics of 
a security are present. 
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